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Abstract
In contrast to other constructivist schools, for Brouwer, the notion of “constructive
object” is not restricted to be presented as ‘words’ in some finite alphabet of sym-
bols, and choice sequences which are non-predetermined and unfinished objects are
legitimate constructive objects. In this way, Brouwer’s constructivism goes beyond
Turing computability. Further, in 1999, the term hypercomputation was introduced
by J. Copeland. Hypercomputation refers to models of computation which go beyond
Church-Turing thesis. In this paper, we propose a hypercomputation called persistently
evolutionary Turing machines based on Brouwer’s notion of being constructive.
1 Introduction
Over the last hundred years, certain mathematicians have tried to rebuilt mathematics
on constructivist principles. However, there are considerable differences between various
representatives of constructivist, and there exists no explicit unique answer to what a con-
structive method is. In contrast to other constructivist schools as Bishop’s and Markov’s,
for Brouwer, the notion of “constructive object” is not restricted to be presented as ‘words’
in some finite alphabet of symbols. According to Brouwer, mathematics is a free creation
of mind, mathematical objects are mental constructions, a languageless activity, and choice
sequences are legitimate constructive objects (see pages 20-21, subsection 4-3 of [22]).
Further, in 1999, the term hypercomputation was introduced by J. Copeland. Hyper-
computation refers to models of computation which go beyond Church-Turing thesis. Hy-
permachines are more powerful than Turing machines because of use of hypercomputational
resources.
Based on Brouwer’s notion of being constructive, we introduce a hypercomputational
resource named “free will” which Brouwer considers it to know choice sequences as legitimate
constructive object. If one does not accept free will for human being, and knows human
being as a Turing machine then all choice sequences are Turing computable. Brouwer is on
the opposite side.
We propose a hypercomputation called persistently evolutionary Turing machines. A
persistently evolutionary Turing machine is a machine that its inner structure during its
computation on any input may evolve.
2 Hypercomputational Resources
In this section, we briefly recall a collection of hypercomputational resources and those
hypermachines that use these resources. We may list following items as some hypercompu-
tational resources (see [17]):
1. non-recursive information sources,
2. infinite memory,
3. infinite specification,
4. infinite computation, and
5. interaction.
The paradigm hypercomputation starts with the o-machine, proposed by Turing in
1939 [23]. O-machine is a Turing machine equipped with an oracle that is capable of
answering questions about the membership of a specific set of natural numbers. If the
oracle set is recursive then the o-machine gains no new power, but if the oracle set is
not itself computable by Turing machines, the o-machine may compute an infinite number
of non-recursive functions. The o-machines use non-recursive information sources [17] as
hypercomputational resources [17].
Coupled Turing machine, introduced by Copeland and Sylvan [9], is a Turing machine
with one or more input channels, providing input to the machine while the computation
is in progress. The specific sequence of input determines the functions that the coupled
Turing machine can perform. It exceeds a Turing machine if the sequence of input is non-
recursive. Like o-machines, coupled Turing machines use non-recursive information sources.
Besides the above discussed hypermachines, Asynchronous network of Turing machines [9],
Error prone Turing machines [17], and Probabilistic Turing machines [15] are well-known
hypermachines that all use non-recursive information sources as their hypercomputation
resources.
Another way to expand the capabilities of a Turing machine is to allow it to begin
with infinite number of symbols initially inscribed on its tape. Turing machines with initial
inscription which have an explicitly infinite amount of storage space are not physically
plausible.
Another kind of Hypermachines is infinite state Turing machines. An infinite state
Turing machine is a Turing machine where the set of states is allowed to be infinite. This
type of machine has an infinite amount of transitions, with only a finite number of transition
from a given state. This gives the Turing machine an infinite program of which only a finite
(but unbounded) amount of transitions is used in any given computation. The infinite state
Turning machines require infinite specification which does not seems physically plausible.
In the last century, Bertrand Russell [18], Ralph Blake [6], and Hermann Weyl [24]
independently proposed the idea of a process that performs its step in one unit of time and
each subsequent step in half the time of the step before [17]. Therefore, such a process could
complete an infinity of steps in two time unit. The application of this temporal patterning
to Turing machines has been discussed briefly by Ian Stewart [20] and in much more depth
by Copeland [8] under the name of accelerated Turing machines. The hypercomputation
resource is infinite computation. To achieve infinite computation through acceleration, we
rapidly run into conflict with physics. For the tape head to get faster and faster, its speed
converges to infinite.
Joel Hamkins and Andy Lewis presented another kind of hypermachines that use infinite
computation [13], named infinite time Turing machines. The infinite time Turing machine
is a natural extension of Turing machine to transfinite ordinal times, the machine would
be able to operate for transfinite numbers of steps. An interesting case about infinite time
Turing machines is that it has been proved P 6= NP for this model of computation [19].
Among other resources: non-recursive information sources, infinite memory, infinite
specification, and infinite computation, the interaction seems to be possible with our cur-
rent physics. A kind of hypermachines that use the interaction as resource is the class
of persistent Turing machines (PTMs), multiple machines with a persistent worktape pre-
served between interactions, independently introduced by Goldin and Wegner [11] and Ko-
sub [14]. Consistent PTMs, a subclass of PTMs, produce the same output string for a given
input string everywhere within a single interaction stream; different interaction streams
may have different outputs for the same input. PTMs are a minimal extension of Turing
machines that express interactive behavior. The behavior of a PTM is characterized by
input-output streams instead of input-output strings. Interaction streams have the form
(i1, o1), (i2, o2), ..., where i’s are input strings and o’s are output strings by PTM. For all
k, ok is computed from ik but preceded and can influence ik+1. The set of all interaction
streams for a PTM M consists its language, L(M). Actually, PTMs extend computing to
computable nonfunctions over histories rather than noncomputable functions over strings,
whereas persistently evolutionary Turing machines (introduced in this paper) extends com-
puting to interactive computable functions which are not predetermined.
3 Intuitionism
There are considerable differences between various representatives of constructivist, and
there exists no explicit unique answer to what a constructive object or a constructive method
is. In contrast to other constructivist schools as Bishop’s and Markov’s [7], for Brouwer,
the notion of “constructive object” is not restricted to have a numerical meaning, or to
be presented as ‘words’ in some finite alphabet of symbols [22]. According to Brouwer,
mathematical objects are mental constructions, a languageless activity and independent of
logic. Brouwer recognized the choice sequences as legitimate mathematical objects [22].
Imagine you have a collection of objects at your disposal, let’s say the natural numbers.
Pick out one of them, and note the result. Put it back into the collection, and choose again.
Since you have the ability to choose freely, you may choose a different one, or the same
again. Record the result, and put it back. You may make further choices and keeping on.
A choice sequence is what you get if you think of the sequence you are making as potentially
infinite [5]. Initial segments are always finite. We cannot make an actually infinite number
of choices, but we can always extend an initial segment by making a further choice. The
following characteristic of the choice sequences is crucial in our consideration:
The subject successively chooses objects, restriction on future choices, restriction on restriction
of future choices, etc. ([4] page 6)
The object of classical mathematics have their properties independently from us and are
static. Choice sequences, in contrast, depends on the subject (who has to make the choice),
and they change through time. They are individual dynamic objects that come into being,
at the moment that the subject decides to intend them, and with each further choice, they
grow, and they are not necessarily predetermined by some law.
static-dynamic An object is static exactly if at no moments parts are added to it, or removed
from it. It is dynamic exactly if at some moment parts are added to it, or removed from
it. ([2], page 12)
Since choice sequences are dynamic objects and are accepted as intuitionistic mathemat-
ical objects, the notion of “constructive method” cannot be captured by Turing computabil-
ity in Brouwer’s point of view. In addition, in intuitionism, the notion of decidability differs
from the notion of recursiveness. Although any recursive set is decidable, the converse is
not true. From intuitionistic view, a subset A of N, is decidable if and only if there exists a
sequence α ∈ 2N, such that, for every n, n ∈ A if and only if α(n) = 1 [1]. It is not required
that the sequence α is given by a finite algorithm, it can be a choice sequence.
Choice sequences are not Turing computable. In constructing choice sequences one uses
a hypercomputational resource which Brouwer calls it choice. Brouwer assumes that the
subject has the ability of choosing freely, and by this assumption the subject is not a Turing
machine. So besides the hypercomputational resources discussed in session 2, we consider
free will as a hypercomputational resource, and introduce Brouwer’s hypercomputation.
A sequence of natural numbers is function from N to N. So choice sequences are sub-
ject dependent and non-predetermined functions. In the sequel, we present hypermachines
named Persistent Evolutionary Turing Machines which compute subject dependent and
non-predetermined functions.
4 Persistent Evolutionary Turing Machines
The notion of being constructive in Brouwer’s intuitionism goes beyond the Church-Turing
thesis. Inspired by Brouwer’s choice sequences, we aim to introduce persistently evolution-
ary Turing machines. A persistently evolutionary Turing machine is a machine that its inner
structure during its computation on any input may evolve. But this evolution is in the way
that if a computist (a user) does not have access to the inner structure of the machine then
he cannot recognize whether the machine evolves or not.
Definition 4.1 Let M1 and M2 be two (deterministic) Turing machines, and x ∈ Σ
∗ be
arbitrary. We say M1 and M2 are x-equivalent, denoted by M1 ≡x M2 whenever
if one of the two machines M1 and M2 outputs y for input x, then the other one also
outputs the same y for the same input x.
Definition 4.2 A Persistently evolutionary Turing machine is a couple N = (〈z0, z1, ..., zi〉, f)
where 〈z0, z1, ..., zi〉 is a growing sequence of codes of deterministic Turing machines, and f
(called the persistently evolutionary function) is a computable partial function from Σ∗×Σ∗
to Σ∗ such that for any code of a Turing machine, say y, and any string x ∈ Σ∗, if y halts
on x then f(y, x) is defined and it is a code of a new Turing machine. The function f
satisfies the following condition (that we call it the persistent condition):
- for every finite sequence (x1, x2, ..., xn, xn+1) of Σ
∗, and every Turing machine y0, if
y1 = f(y0, x1), y2 = f(y1, x2),..., yn = f(yn−1, xn) and yn+1 = f(yn, xn+1) are defined
then we have for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, yn+1 ≡xi+1 yi.
Whenever an input x is given to N , the output of the evolutionary machine N is computed
according to the zi (z1 = f(z0, x1), z2 = f(z1, x2),... zi = f(zi−1, xi), where x1, x2, ..., xi are
strings that sequentially have given as inputs to N until now, and N has halted for all of
them), and the machine evolves to N = (〈z0, z1, ..., zi, zi+1 = f(zi, x)〉, f) (if zi halts for x).
Note that since the evolution happens persistently, as soon as N provides an output for an
input x, if we will input the same x to N again in future, then N provides the same output
as before. It says that, the machine N behaves well-defined as an input-output black box.
The persistently evolutionary Turing computation could be assumed as one of forms of
Hypercomputation [16, 21]. Note that at each moment of time, a persistently evolutionary
Turing machine has a finite structure, but during computations on inputs, its structure may
change. So it is not possible to encode a persistently evolutionary Turing machine in a finite
word. In Brouwer’ constructivism, choice sequences are accepted as constructive objects.
But choice sequences can not be represented in finite codes. A persistently evolutionary
Turing machine is an interactive machine (see Chapter 5 of [21], and [10]) that evolves
according to how it interacts with its users. One may compare persistently evolutionary
Turing machines with persistent Turing machines (PTM). The difference between these
two kinds of machines is that PTM’s are static machines that transform input streams
(infinite sequence of strings) to output streams persistently [12, 11, 14], whereas persistently
evolutionary Turing machines are evolutionary machines that transform input strings to
output strings.
We may start with two equal persistently evolutionary Turing machines N1 = (z0, f)
and N2 = (z
′
0, f
′) where z0 = z
′
0 and f = f
′, but as we input strings to two machines in
different orders the machines may evolve in different ways.
Example 4.3 Let z0 be a code of an arbitrary Turing machine, and I : Σ
∗ → Σ∗ be the
function I(y, x) = y for all x, y ∈ Σ∗. Then N = (z0, I) is a persistently evolutionary
Turing machine which acts exactly like the Turing machine z0. Thus any Turing machine
can be considered as a persistently evolutionary Turing machine as well.
Similar to choice sequences which are subject dependent, persistent evolutionary Turing
machines are user dependent. A user who just has access to the input-output behavior of an
evolutionary Turing machine N , cannot become conscious whether the machine N evolves
or not. In other words, if we put a persistently evolutionary machine in a black box, a
computist (a user) can never be aware that whether it is a (static) Turing machine in the
black box, or a persistently evolutionary one.
In the next example, we let NFA1 be the class of all nondeterministic finite automata
that for each M ∈ NFA1, each state q of M , and a ∈ Σ, there exists at most one transition
from q with label a. We take advantage of the persistent evolutionary Turing machine
introduced in this example 4.4 in the sequel of the paper.
Example 4.4 We define a function h : NFA1 × Σ
∗ → NFA1 as follows. Let M ∈ NFA1,
M = 〈Q, q0,Σ = {0, 1}, δ : Q×Σ→ Q,F ⊆ Q〉, and x ∈ Σ
∗. Suppose x = a0a1 · · · ak where
ai ∈ Σ. Applying the automata M on x, one of the three following cases may happen:
1. The automata M could read all a0, a1 · · · , ak successfully and stops in an accepting
state. Then we let h(M,x) =M .
2. The automata M could read all a0, a1 · · · , ak successfully and stops in a state p which
is not an accepting state. If the automata M can transit from p to an accepting
state by reading one alphabet, then we define h(M,x) = M . If it cannot transit (to
an accepting state) then we define h(M,x) to be a new automata M ′ = 〈Q, q′0,Σ =
{0, 1}, δ′ : Q′ × Σ→ Q′, F ′ ⊆ Q′〉, where Q′ = Q, δ′ = δ, F ′ = F ∪ {p}.
3. The automata M cannot read all a0, a1 · · · , ak successfully,and after reading a part of
x, say a0a1 · · · ai, 0 ≤ i ≤ k, it crashes in a state q that δ(q, ai+1) is not defined. In this
case, we let h(M,x) be a new automata M ′ = 〈Q, q′0,Σ = {0, 1}, δ
′ : Q′×Σ→ Q′, F ′ ⊆
Q′〉, where Q′ = Q∪{si+1, si+2, · · · , sk} (all si+1, si+2, · · · , sk are different states that
does not belong to Q), δ′ = δ ∪ {(q, ai+1, si+1), (si+1, ai+2, si+2), · · · , (sk−1, ak, sk)},
and F ′ = F ∪ {sk}.
For each M ∈ NFA1, we let TM be a Turing machine that for each input x ∈ Σ
∗, the
machine TM first constructs the automata h(M,x), and if h(M,x) accepts x, then TM
outputs 1, else it outputs 0.
We define the persistently evolutionary Turing machine PT = 〈⌊TM0⌋, f〉, where M
0 =
〈Q0 = {q0}, q0,Σ = {0, 1}, δ
0 = ∅, F 0 = ∅〉, and f(⌊TM⌋, x) = ⌊Th(M,x)⌋.
Definition 4.5 Let N = (〈z0, z1, ..., zi〉, f) be a persistently evolutionary Turing machine.
A language L ⊆ Σ∗ intended by the subject (the user) via N is the set of all strings which
the subject chooses and inputs them to N , and N outputs 1 for them.
A language which is intended by the user (the subject) via a persistently evolutionary
Turing machine is an unfinished and subject-dependent object (similar to Brouwer’s choice
sequences). At each stage of time, only a finite part of it, is recognized with the subject
who intends the language. Persistently evolutionary Turing machines exist in time and are
temporal dynamic mental constructions (see page 16 of [3]). Also a language intended by a
persistently evolutionary Turing machine is user-dependent. Two users with two persistently
evolutionary Turing machines N1 and N2 with the same initial structure may intend two
different languages. For a language defined through a persistently evolutionary Turing
machine, membership status of an element is not predetermined and is dependent to the
free will of the user.
The initial structure N = (z0, f) of a persistently evolutionary Turing machine is con-
structed at a particular moment of time, and then evolves as the user chooses further strings
to input. For persistently evolutionary Turing machines what remains invariant is the char-
acter of the machine as an evolutionary machine, an evolution that started at a particular
point in time and preserves well-definedness. The machine evolves but it is the same ma-
chine that evolves and the machine is an individual unfinished object. Note that the user
is not allowed to reset the machine and goes back to past. It is because that the evolution
is a characteristic of persistently evolutionary Turing machines.
Hypercomputation extends the capabilities of Turing computation via using new re-
sources such as 1- infinite memory, 2- infinite specification, 3- infinite computation and 4-
the interaction. Among these four resources, the resources 1,2, and 3 do not seem physi-
cally plausible as they have infinite structures. But the forth one, the interaction, seems
physically plausible for the human being. The human being interacts with its environment
and it could be possible that its environment persistently evolve because of interaction. The
persistently evolutionary Turing machines use two resources to be Hypercomputations 1-
evolution, and 2- interaction which arise from considering free will for the subject who in-
tends languages with persistent evolutionary Turing machines. Both of these two resources
could be accepted by the human being as physically plausible resources (Biological struc-
tures evolve in Darwin theory). One may hesitate to accept that Persistently evolutionary
Turing machines are physically plausible due to his presupposition that the real world is a
Turing machine, but if he releases himself from this confinement then it seems to him that
persistently evolutionary Turing machines are as physically plausible as he knows Turing
machines are. One can implement a persistently evolutionary Turing machine on his per-
sonal computer (assuming that the computer has an infinite memory; note that the same
assumption is needed for executing Turing machines on a computer). The difference be-
tween Turing machines and persistently evolutionary Turing machines is that the languages
that the first category recognize are predetermined, whereas in the second category, we can
recognize an unfinished and non-predetermined language which are subject-dependent.
We may list the following items for why persistently evolutionary Turing machines seems
plausible as a constructive approach:
1- The persistently evolutionary Turing computation is a kind of interactive computa-
tion [10] which today is accepted as a new paradigm of computation by some computer
scientist.
2- The persistently evolutionary Turing machines are as plausible as Turing machines
are. Both machines can be simulated by a personal computer (assuming that the
computer has an infinite memory).
3- In Brouwer’s intuitionism, choice sequences are accepted as constructive mathematical
objects. Choice sequences are growing, unfinished objects. Therefore, the persistently
evolutionary Turing machines as growing unfinished objects are acceptable as con-
structive mathematical objects in Brouwer’s intuitionism.
4.1 Persistent Evolution
Suppose B to be an input-output black box. For an observer who does not have access to
the inner structure of the black box, it is not possible to get aware that whether the inner
structure of the black box persistently evolves or not. We only sense a change whenever we
discover that an event which has been sensed before is not going to be sensed similar to
past. Persistently evolution always respects the past. As soon as, a subject experiences an
event then whenever in future he examines the same event, he will experience it similar to
past. However, persistent evolution effects the future which has not been predetermined,
and not experienced by the subject yet. Therefore,
it is not possible for an agent to distinguish between persistent evolution and
being static based on the history of his observation.1
1The above statement is the same as Brouwer’s continuity principle for choice sequences.
4.2 Non Pre-determinism
Suppose N = (z0, f) is a persistently evolutionary Turing machine. The machine N could
evolve in different ways due to the free will of the user who chooses freely strings to input
to N . For example, consider the persistently evolutionary Turing machine PT = 〈⌊TM0⌋, f〉
introduced in example 4.4. If you inputs two strings 111, and 11 respectively, the machine
PT outputs 1 for the first input and outputs 0 for the second one. Inputting the string 111
makes the machine to evolve such that it cannot accept 11 anymore. The time has sink
back to past, and the machine PT evolved.
However, you had the free will 2 to input first 11 and then 111, and if this case had
happened, the machine would have accepted both of them.
The user of a persistently evolutionary Turing machine cannot change the past by his free
will, but he can effect the future by his free choices. As soon as a persistently evolutionary
Turing machine evolves, it has been evolved, and it is not possible to go back to past. When
a persistently evolutionary machine evolves, it is the same machine that evolves, and the
evolution is a part of the entity of the machine.
However, since the user has the free will, he can effect the future. The future is not
necessary predetermined, and the user can make lots of different futures due to his free will.
For example, let L be the set of all strings that the evolutionary machine PT , during the
interaction with a user, outputs 1 for them. The language L is not predetermined, and it
is a growing and an unfinished object (similar to choice sequences). Consider the formula
φ := (∃k ∈ N)(∀n > k)(∃x ∈ Σ∗)(|x| = n ∧ x ∈ L).
At each stage of time, having evidence for the truth of formula φ conflicts with the free will
of the user, and we never could have evidence for truth of φ. It is because that at each stage
of time, only for a finite number of strings in Σ∗, it is predetermined that whether they are
in L or not. Let m ∈ N be such that m would be greater than the length of all strings that
until now are determined to be in L. The user via his free will can input all strings with
length m+ 1 to the machine PT respectively. The machine PT outputs 1 for all of them,
and evolves such that L ∩ {x ∈ Σ∗ | |x| = m} would be empty. Also, at each stage of time
having evidence for ¬φ conflicts with the free will of the subject. Again, let m ∈ N be such
that m would be grater than the length of all strings that until now are determined to be
in L. The user via his free will can input a string with length m to the machine PT . The
machine PT outputs 1 for it.
Theorem 4.6 Let L ⊆ Σ∗ be the growing language intended by a user (who has free will)
through the persistently evolutionary Turing machine PT . let
φ := (∃k ∈ N)(∀n > k)(∃x ∈ Σ∗)(|x| = n ∧ x ∈ L).
We can never have evidence not for ϕ and not for ¬ϕ.
Proof. See the above argument. ⊣
2The notion of free will is appeared in mathematics by Brouwer’s choice sequences (see [1] and [5]).
5 Hyper-computable Functions
In this section, we define computable functions via persistently evolutionary Turing ma-
chines.
Definition 5.1 Let N = (〈z0, z1, ..., zi〉, f) be a persistently evolutionary Turing machine.
A function F : Σ∗ → Σ∗ intended by the subject (the user) via N is the set of all pairs (x, y)
which the subject chooses x and inputs to N , and N outputs y at some moment of time.
We refer to the collection of all functions which are intended by the subject via a persistent
evolutionary Turing machine by PF.
Every function F ∈ PF is an unfinished, dynamic, and subject dependent object. For each
x ∈ Σ∗ the value of F (x) is not predetermined and is determined as soon as the subject who
intended F via a persistently evolutionary Turing machine, say N , chooses x and inputs it
in N .
It is easy to check that all Turing computable functions belong to PF. Brouwer’s choice
sequences can be assumed as functions from N to N. Let TF denotes Turing computable
total functions and CN denotes choice sequences. We have
TF  PF  CN.
Theorem 5.2 TF  PF ⊆ CN.
Proof.
• TF  PF.
Let F ∈ TF. Then there exists a Turing machine T such that T computes f . Let
z0 be the code of Turing machine T , and let f : N → N be such that f(z0) = z0.
Then N = (〈z0〉, f) computes F . Thus TF ⊆ PF. The characteristic function of
the language L of the machine PT (see example 4.4) belongs to PF but not TF.
Assuming that the characteristic function of the language L of the machine PT is
Turing computable conflicts with the assumption that human being has free will.
• PF ⊆ CN.
Let F ∈ PF, then there exists a persistently evolutionary Turning machine N =
(〈z0〉, f) such that subject intends F through it. The function F can be assumed
as a choice sequence 〈F (n)〉n∈N where the subject intends it by choosing freely some
natural number n and do some computation on it and consider the result to be F (n).
In this way, we have PF  CN.
⊣
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